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RECENT CASES
FEDERAL TAXATION-EFFECT OF A STATE COURT ADJUDICATION OF
PROPERTY RIG11TS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION
In 1930, Herman Bosch set up a revocable and amendable trust, the terms
of which provided that the income from the corpus was to be paid to his wife
during her lifetime. Mr. Bosch amended the trust in 1931 to give his wife a
general power of appointment. In 1951, Mrs. Bosch executed an instrument
purporting to release her general power of appointment and convert it into a
special power of appointment. This was done to prevent the assets of the trust
from being taxed as part of Mrs. Bosch's gross estate. Upon Mr. Bosch's death
in 1957, his executor claimed the 1951 release by Mrs. Bosch to be invalid under
state law and accordingly sought a marital deduction in the amount of the trust.
The Commissioner, however, relying on Mrs. Bosch's purported release of her
general power of appointment, determined that the trust corpus did not qualify
for a marital deduction under section 2056 (b) (5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code,1 and levied a deficiency. The executor filed a petition for a redetermination
in the Tax Court. While the Tax Court proceeding was pending, the executor
filed a petition in the supreme court of New York seeking a determination of
the validity of the 1951 release by Mrs. Bosch under state law. The Tax
Court, with the consent of the Commissioner, abstained from making its decision
pending the outcome of the state court action. The state court found the release
to be a nullity.2 The Tax Court, while carefully stating that it did not consider it-
self bound by the state court decree, accepted the decree as an "authoritative ex-
position of New York law and adjudication of the property rights involved," and
allowed the marital deduction.3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5) provides:
In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving
spouse is entitled for life to all income from the entire interest . . .with power in
the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest . . . (exercisable in favor of such
surviving spouse, ... or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the power
is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other person to ap-
point any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the
surviving spouse-
(A) the interest ... thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a),
be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall for purposes of paragraph (1) (A),
be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.
2. Matter of Irving Trust Co. (Bosch), 150 N.Y.LJ., Nov. 15, 1963, at 14, col. 3
(Sup. Ct.). In this proceeding separate briefs were filed in behalf of Mrs. Bosch, the trustee,
and by a guardian ad litem in behalf of one of twenty-two minors who might possibly
become beneficiaries if Mrs. Bosch died without exercising her power of appointment, all
three briefs argued that Mrs. Bosch's release was a nullity. See Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1966).
In the New York Supreme Court's opinion it was stated that Mrs. Bosch's purported
release was a nullity. The Court reasoned that Mrs. Bosch could not exercise her power of
appointment in 1951 while Mr. Bosch was still alive, and therefore Mrs. Bosch could not
release it. That is, a power of appointment is not releasable prior to the time it can be exer-
cised when the power is created under a revocable deed of trust and is exercisable at will.
The Court cited Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888) as authority for its
decision.
3. Herman J. Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966),
rev'd, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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Circuit, Judge Friendly dissenting, affirmed the Tax Court decision.4 The Su-
preme Court, Justices Douglas, Harlan and Fortas dissenting, reversed and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.5 Held, Where a state court deter-
mination of property rights is material to subsequent federal tax litigation,
federal authority, in the absence of a decision on point by the State's highest
court, must apply what it finds to be the state law after giving "proper regard"
to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
The Supreme Court has stated, "State law creates legal interests or rights.
The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall
be taxed."6 Here, the federal estate tax statute is dependent on property rights
created under state law since there are no federal definitions or standards pro-
vided.7 The use of state law in applying the federal statute gives rise to the
very difficult question of what effect a lower state court determination of prop-
erty rights has in subsequent federal tax litigation regarding those same property
rights. The Supreme Court has ruled on the effect of state court determinations
of property rights in Freuler v. Helvering8 and Blair v. Commissioner.9 These
decisions, however, are the only two Supreme Court cases directly on point,
and both are over thirty years old.
While Freuler and Blair each held a state court decree to be conclusive in
a federal court, their dicta indicated that a state court decree obtained through
collusion would not be binding on a federal court. In Freuler, the Commissioner
argued that the state trial court decree was not binding on the federal courts
because it was "collusive in the sense that all parties joined in a submission of
the issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect the Government's
right to additional income tax."'10 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
on the facts of Freuler but did not accept, reject, or even comment on this
definition of collusion as argued by the Commissioner. Nor did the Court explic-
itly state what the effect of a "collusive" state court decree would be on federal
tax litigation. Unfortunately, Blair did little to clarify Freuler as to the defini-
tion of a collusion and the effect of collusive state court decrees. In holding an
4. In affirming, the majority opinion stated that the "New York judgment, rendered
by a court which had jurisdiction over parties and subject matter, authoritatively settled
the rights of the parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the application
to those rights of the relevant provisions of federal tax law." Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1966).
5. On remand, the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, stated, "Upon considera-
tion of the briefs and arguments when the Commissioner's petition to review was first before
us and supplemental briefs filed by the parties upon remand from the Supreme Court of
the United States, we conclude that the New York Court of Appeals would not follow the
decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, in Matter of Irving Trust Co. (Bosch),
but would uphold the partial release of the general power of appointment. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Tax Court is reversed." 382 F.2d 295 (1967).
6. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
7. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
8. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
9. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
10. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
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Illinois Appellate Court decision binding on federal courts, Blair said simply,
Nor is there any basis for a charge that the suit was collusive and the
decree inoperative. Freuler v. Helvering, supra. The trustees were en-
titled to seek the instructions of the court having supervision of the
trust. That court entertained the suit and the appellate court, with the
first decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals before it, reviewed the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the State and reached a deliberate
conclusion. To derogate from the authority of that conclusion and of
the decree is commanded, ... would be wholly unwarranted in the exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction.1 1
A widespread conflict developed among the Circuit Courts concerning the
effect of state court decrees following Freuler and Blair.12 The genesis of this
conflict was the lack of precise guidelines in Freuler and Blair relative to "col-
lusion" and "collusive" state court decrees. The manifestation of this conflict
was the development in the circuit courts of very inconsistent interpretations
of "collusion." The Fifth Circuit, as illustrated by Saulsbury v. United States,' 3
used the so-called "non-adversary approach"1 4 to determine whether a state
court decision would be binding on a federal court. The Fifth Circuit equated
non-adversary and collusive proceedings, and accordingly held non-adversary
proceedings as not binding on federal courts. In explaining their position, the
Saulsbury court stated,
By the word collusion, we do not mean to imply fraudulent or improper
conduct, but simply that all interested parties agreed to the order and
that it was apparently to their advantage from a tax standpoint to do
so. We mean that there was no genuine issue of law or fact as to the
right of the beneficiary to receive this income, and no bona fide contro-
versy between the trustee and the beneficiary as to property rights un-
der the trust instrument.' 5
Gallagher v. Smith,'0 in the Third Circuit, represents the position that a
showing of actual fraud is required in order to find a state court decree collu-
sive.17 Under Gallagher, non-adversity is considered only as evidence of collusion,
and is not sufficient in and of itself to prevent a state court decree from having
11. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937). But, Blair involved a state appellate
court decree, while Freuler was concerned with a state trial court decree.
12. Compare Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955), with Estate of Faulker-
son v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), and Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner,
336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
13. 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952).
14. See Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal
Tax Litigation, 17 Tax L. Rev. 545 (1962); Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's
Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 Tax L. Rev. 213 (1957).
15. 199 F.2d 578, 580 (Sth Cir. 1952). See also Estate of Stallworth v. Commissioner,
260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Farish, 233 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Tex. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1966). For discussion of "non-adversary" approach,
see Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
16. 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
17. See Braverman & Gerson, supra note 14, at 551-54; Colowick, supra note 14, at
218-20.
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a conclusive effect in a federal court.' 8 The Second Circuit's determination of
the Bosch'9 case seemed to align it with the Gallagher rule, although some
differences between the two have been noted.20 The Seventh Circuit took still
a third approach.21 In an early case, Brainard v. Commissioner,22 it held a state
trial court decree not binding on a federal court because the questions had not
been decided by the Supreme or Appellate Court of Illinois; consequently, the
federal court determined the state law itself.2 3 In a relatively recent case, Estate
of Faulkerson v. United States,24 the Seventh Circuit also held a state trial court
decree not binding on a federal court, relying heavily on Brainard25 in its deci-
sion.26 The Sixth Circuit 27 and the Ninth Circuit28 in more recent cases seemed
18. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955); accord, Parlington v. Com-
missioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962). See Comment, The Binding Effect of a Non-Adversary
State Court Decree in Federal Tax Determination, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 705 (1965)(favoring the Gallagher approach). See also Teschner, State Court Decisions, Federal Taxa-
tion, and The Commissioner's Wonderland: The Need for Preliminary Characterization, 41
Taxes 98 (1963).
19. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
20. See Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1007, 1009 (1966); Note, 42 Notre Dame Law. 550,
554 (1967). Both Notes point out the consideration of other factors, in addition to ad-
versity, by the Tax Court and by the Second Circuit which approved the Tax Court's ap-
proach. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1966). Justice Fortas
expressly approved the use of these additional factors, mentioned by the Tax Court, 43 T.C.
120, 124, in his dissent in Bosch, specifically mentioning,
Whether the state court had jurisdiction; and whether its determination is fully
binding on the parties; whether in practice, the decisions of the state court have
precedential value throughout the State; whether the Commissioner was aware of
the state proceedings and had an opportunity to participate; whether the state court
"rendered a reasoned opinion and reached a deliberate conclusion," Blair v. Com-
missioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10; whether the state decision has potentially off-setting,
tax consequences in respect of the state court litigant's federal taxes; and, in
general, whether the state court decision "authoritatively determined future
property rights and thus . . . provided more than a label for past events."
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 484.
21. See Richter, Effect of State Court Interpretation of Wills, N.Y.U. 24th Inst. on
Fed. Tax 257, 261-62 (1966).
22. 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937).
23. Id. at 883-84.
24. 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962).
25. Id. at 233.
26. The Seventh Circuit has been considered by some to fall into the group following
the non-adversary or Saulsbury approach. See Note, 42 Notre Dame Law 550, 553 (1967);
Note, 45 N.CL. Rev. 308, 314 (1966). While Brainard does not use the non-adversary ap-
proach, Faulkerson, even though relying heavily on Brainard, does mention adversity as
an additional factor, 301 F.2d 231, 233. See Richter, supra note 21, at 262. See generally
Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decrees, 51 Yale L.J.
783 (1942).
Although the Supreme Court in Bosch reads it as such, Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463 (1967), it is not clear that Brainard required a decision of the
highest court of the state by the words, "Supreme or Appellate," 91 F.2d 880 883-84 (7th
Cir. 1937). Faulkerson's mention of adversity as an additional factor to be considered,
301 F.2d at 233, further casts doubt on the view that the Seventh Circuit requires a
decision by the State's highest court before holding a state court decree as binding.
It has been suggested that the strict view, relative to holding a state court decree
conclusive, of the Seventh Circuit is due to the fact situations in Brainard and Faulkerson.
In each case the state trial court decree in question was entered by a state court that was
of equal jurisdiction with many others, and at a level where the decisions of each similar
court were not binding on each other: see Richter, supra note 21, at 262.
27. Compare Nashville Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1943),
with Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966).
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to be moving toward the Gallagher rule of the Third Circuit.29 The Fourth,30
Eighth3' and Tenth3 2 Circuits seemed to follow the non-adversary approach of
the Fifth Circuit in Saulsbury. In the First Circuit the issue did not seem to be
resolved in favor of any particular position.3 3
The preceding survey of Circuit Court decisions illustrates the conflict con-
cerning the effect of a state court determination in subsequent federal tax litiga-
tion. There were differences even among circuits adhering to one of the main
doctrines.3 4 Thus, it is obvious that the situation was ripe for the Supreme Court
to end its thirty year silence on the issue and resolve this longstanding conflict
among the circuit courts.3 5
The Court, in the instant case, was confronted with the issue of what effect
the state trial court determination of the validity of Mrs. Bosch's 1951 release
should have in federal tax litigation concerning those same property rights. The
"res judicata" and "full faith and credit clause" arguments were dismissed by
citing Freuler36 and noting that the Commissioner was not a party to the state
proceeding. The legislative history of the marital deduction provision was
examined, as well as the specific limitations of the statute which defines the
marital deduction. After considering these two factors, the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend that state trial court determinations were to be conclu-
sive on the computation of the federal estate tax. It found, instead, a Congres-
sional intent to construe and apply strictly the marital deduction, and a desire
to eliminate loopholes and to protect the federal revenue by giving only "proper
regard" to state court determinations. Authority was cited showing that state
judicial decisions are held to be laws of the state.3 7 Thus, it was reasoned that
under the Rules of Decision Act,38 state court decrees, as laws of the state, are
regarded as rules of decision where they apply in civil actions in federal courts.
28. Compare Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955), with Flitcroft v.
Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964). See Richter, supra note 21, at 267.
29. See Note, 45 N.CLI. Rev. 308, 312 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
31. See, e.g., Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
32. See, e.g., Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956).
33. Compare Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st Cir.
1956), with Plunkett v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1941).
34. See, e.g., discussion of administration of non-adversary approach in Braverman &
Gerson, supra note 14, at 559-66, and Colowick, supra note 14, at 221-229.
35. See generally 10 J. Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 61.03 (P. Zimet rev.
1964); Braverman & Gerson, supra note 14; Cahan, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 Yale
L.J. 799 (1943); Cardozo, supra note 26; Colowick, supra note 14; Oliver, The Nature of the
Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638 (1953);
Richter, supra note 21; Sacks, The Binding Effect of Nontax Litigation in State Courts,
N.Y.U. 21st Inst. on Fed. Tar.. 277 (1963); Sonnenschein, The Binding Effect of a State
Court Decree with Reference to Property Rights Affected by Federal Taxation, 7 Fed. B.J.
251 (1946); Stephens & Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudication in Federal
Controversies, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 223 (1961) ; Teschner, supra note 18.
36. The Court cited Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43, in Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 462.
37. The Court cited Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) in Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
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The Court then turned to a discussion of the Erie v. Tompkins 0 doctrine and
its application to the instant case. A diversity case was cited to illustrate that
while a lower state court is attributed some weight in a federal court, its deci-
sion is not controlling where the state's highest court has not spoken on the
point.40 Furthermore, it was noted that under some conditions federal authority
may not be bound even by a state intermediate appellate court ruling.41 The
Court then reasoned that since a state intermediate appellate court decree is
not necessarily binding on a federal court in a diversity action, it follows a
fortiori that a state trial court decision, as to underlying state law involving the
application of a federal statute, should not be controlling. Thus, the Court holds
in Bosch that the Erie doctrine will apply in that the federal court will, absent
a judgment by the state's highest court, determine state law itself after giving
proper regard to relevant decisions of other courts of the state. This extrapola-
tion of the Erie rule from diversity cases to the instant case is justified, according
to the Court, because the reasons for applying the Erie doctrine are present in
both situations. That is, in both cases the underlying substantive rule is based
on state law. The Court felt this approach preferable because it avoids the
characteristic uncertainty of the "non-adversary" approach, while still protecting
the federal fisc and treating the taxpayer fairly.42
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, took a position very similar to the Gallagher
approach contending that a federal court should be bound by a state court
determination unless the state decree is a consent decree, or was obtained by
fraud or collusion.43
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, advocated the "non-adversary" approach
for the Bosch situation.44 Mr. Justice Fortas joined in this view, but stated that
several other factors should be considered in addition to adversity.45 The addi-
tional factors suggested by Mr. Justice Fortas are those first articulated in the
Tax Court decision of the Bosch case.46
While the Bosch Court cites legislative history and mentions the Rules of
Decision Act, the discussion concerning the extrapolation of the Erie doctrine
to Bosch is the crucial portion of the Court's reasoning. 47 As mentioned before,
39. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40. The case cited by the Court was King v. Order of United Comm. Travelers, 333 U.S.
153 (1948).
41. The Court cited West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
42. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
43. Id. at 466-71.
44. Id. at 471-83.
45. Id. at 483-84.
46. Herman J. Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 123-24 (1964) ; see supra note 20 for list of these
factors.
47. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964) while applicable, does not
solve the problem here, viz., the effect of a state court decision in litigation of a federal
question. The legislative history cited by the court is cryptic and equivocal and cannot be
said to dictate nor eliminate any specific conclusion. The material cited can easily be called
obscure considering the context in which it appears. It consists of one sentence: "In this
connection proper regard should be given to interpretations of the will rendered by a
court in a bona fide adversary proceeding," S. Rep. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,
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the Court analogized Bosch to Erie, noted the similarity relative to the use of
state law, and then held the Erie doctrine to be applicable to Bosch. The Court
has used this analogy only as persuasive authority to support its policy decision.
This analogy was not used as compulsive authority, which would dictate an a
fortiori decision. That is, the Court did not say this was an Erie situation, but
rather that the Erie doctrine can be adopted here since the Erie and Bosch
situations are similar. Due to a fundamental difference in the basis for using state
law, the analogy cannot be properly used as more than persuasive authority.48
This analysis is substantiated by the actual language of the Court,49 and the
Court's express recitation of the policy advantages of its newly promulgated
approach."o
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bosch ends a widespread conflict in the cir-
cuit courts that had existed since Freuler and Blair thirty years before. The
approach set out by Bosch, while very similar to that used by the Seventh Cir-
cuit,5 ' does not seem to have been seriously considered by any of the other
circuit courts. Prior to Bosch, the circuits were generally polarized around either
the Gallagher rule (collusion equals actual fraud) or the "non-adversary" ap-
proach. Essentially, these approaches were different interpretations of "collusion"
as drawn and developed from Freuler and Blair. In Bosch, however, the Supreme
Court rejected collusion and adversity as criteria for determining the effect of
state court determinations. Consequently all the circuits, except possibly the Sev-
enth, must now abandon their collusion-oriented approaches to the problem. In
addition, it now appears that the federal courts must apply the Bosch rule to all
situations involving the application of a federal tax statute to rights held under
state law, since the Court nowhere expressly or impliedly limited the holding to
the marital deduction situation.
In comparison with the Gallagher rule, Bosch seems to offer a clearly supe-
4 (1948), which is not elaborated upon anywhere else in the extremely lengthy document in
which it appears. Cited in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 464 (1967).
48. The fundamental difference vis-i-vis the use of underlying state law is a func-
tion of the difference between the Erie situation and the Bosch situation. In Erie, federal
authority provides a neutral forum for a contest between parties of diverse citizenship
with state substantive law the criterion for the court's decision of what is essentially a state
law controversy. In Bosch however, a federal question is involved and state law is used only
because federal authority has chosen to incorporate state law in the administration of the
federal statute taxing estates. Thus in the Erie situation the federal court must apply what it
finds to be relevant state substantive law. However, in the Bosch situation involving a federal
question, a federal court could conceivably disregard even a decision by the state's highest
court if that decision was found to severely hamper federal taxing policy. See Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). Thus, while both Bosch and Erie are concerned with
underlying state law, the Erie rule does not apply a fortiori to the Bosch situation because
there is a fundamental difference in the basis for the use of state law in these two situations.
49. The Court stated, "This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be
applied for the same reason, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on
state law and the state's highest court is the best authority on its own law.' Commissioffer
v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
50. The Court stated, "We believe that this would avoid much of the uncertainty that
would result from the "non-adversary" approach and at the same time would be fair to the
taxpayer and protect the federal revenue as well." Id. at 465.
51. See note 26 for a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's position vis-h-vis the Supreme
Court's ruling in Bosch.
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rior approach. Gallagher, probably the most literal interpretation of Freuler and
Blair, required a finding of actual fraud to hold a state court determination
"collusive" and therefore not binding on a federal court. Since an inaccurate
state- court determination can result without actual fraud, a federal court could
be bound by an erroneous state court decision under Gallagher. The background
of the Bosch case clearly illustrates this inherent defect of the Gallagher ap-
proach.5 2 Bosch rectifies this defect by permitting the federal court to examine
the accuracy of the state court decisions in the light of relevant state law. Thus,
the Bosch approach provides much more protection of the federal fisc than does
Gallagher.
The superiority of the Bosch rule over the non-adversary approach is
not as clear cut, however. The rationale of the non-adversary approach assumes
that a truly adversary proceeding, with inconsistent views vigorously urged
upon the court, best assures an accurate determination by the state court. Al-
though the adversary method is an integral part of our legal system, the prob-
lems with its use as a standard in this context seem to make the Bosch approach
preferable.
First, in some instances an adversary proceeding is not even theoretically
possible, as in the situation where the interests of all the beneficiaries of a will
coincide. For example, an executor, for federal estate tax purposes, may desire
to reduce the taxable estate by the amount of state inheritance taxes paid.
The statute permits this reduction only if the benefit of the reduction inures
solely to charitable transferees.58 Therefore, the executor will seek a state court
determination that the desired reduction of the taxable estate will benefit chari-
table transferees only. If the will provides that the estate taxes should be borne
by the estate, obviously neither the charitable transferees nor the other legatees
will oppose the executor's attempt to reduce the federal estate tax paid by the
estate.54 In such a situation a court using the non-adversary approach would
not be bound by a state court determination regardless of how well-considered
that decision may bey5
Second, the actual administration of the non-adversary approach may be
a problem. Precisely what constitutes an adversary proceeding is an elusive
question. In determining whether a state proceeding was adversary or not, a
federal court will consider such factors as: the financial adversity of the parties,
whether the state court action appears to have been brought solely to avoid
federal taxes, whether an appeal has been taken, the apparent degree of error
of the state court decision, the level of the state court, and the actual tax conse-
52. On remand, the Second Circuit found in fact that the decision of the state court
holding Mrs. Bosch's release invalid, Matter of Irving Trust Co. (Bosch), 190 N..YJ..J.,
Nov. 15, 1963, at 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) was contrary to state law. See quote in supra note 5.
Thus the Second Circuit had been bound by an inaccurate state court determination while
using the Gallagher approach. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 362 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.
1966).
53. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2053(d) (1), (2).
54. See, e.g., Estate of Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962).
55. See Braverman & Gerson, supra note 14, at 570-72.
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quences of the state court determination. Since these factors vary widely in each
factual situation, the non-adversary approach tends to deteriorate to a factorial,
case-by-case approach, resulting in a lack of certainty and predictability as to the
outcome of such cases.56 Under Bosch, the determination of a federal court is
as predictable as that of a state court since state law is now the frame of refer-
ence for both federal and state court decisions
Third, the Bosch holding permits a more direct confrontation with the
fundamental issue than does the non-adversary approach. Both seek to assure
that only accurate state court determinations are binding on subsequent federal
tax litigation. One approach (the non-adversary) relies on the existence of an
adversary proceeding as the standard to achieve this result, while the other
(Bosch) actually examines the state court determination in the light of rele-
vant state law. Thus, the fundamental issue-whether the state court decree is
an accurate determination of state law-is" directly confronted and examined
under the Bosch rule. The non-adversary approach, in contrast, utilizes the
somewhat indirect, superficial criterion of adversity to determine the effect of
the state court decision.
The approach set out in Bosch is not, however, beyond criticism. One
possibility, mentioned by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent,57 is that under
Bosch a taxpayer may be denied certain rights with respect to property by state
law, but may still be required to pay a federal tax as though he enjoyed those
rights. For example, a state court determines that A is not the owner of Black-
acre; A, therefore, cannot enjoy the benefits of owning Blackacre. Subsequently,
a federal court could disregard the state court determination, find A to be the
owner of Blackacre and accordingly hold A liable for federal taxes on the prop-
erty. This criticism also applies to the non-adversary approach. Only the Galla-
gher rule is not subject to this injustice, since under Gallagher the federal courts
always accepted the state court decision absent actual fraud. Only a perpetra-
tor of fraud could be a victim. Of course, a taxpayer finding himself in this
situation can always appeal the state court decision, but this admittedly is a
heavy burden. While this criticism is a valid one, the Bosch rule, with its
superior protection of the federal fisc, still appears to be preferable to the al-
ternative, Gallagher.
The most justifiable criticism of Bosch is that the power of the federal
courts to disregard state court decrees is now virtually unlimited. Bosch states
that, absent a decision on point by the state's highest court, the federal court
will determine state law itself after giving proper regard to relevant rulings of
other state courts. As a practical matter, an able attorney can always argue
some distinction between two cases. Thus, by distinguishing all the decisions of
the state's highest court from the controversy at bar, the Commissioner will
often be able to force the federal court to determine state law itself. In effect,
56. See Colowick, supra note 14, at 221-29.
57. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 470-71.
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the Commissioner now has carte blanche to litigate de novo almost any state
court determination that he deems to be unfavorable.
An examination of the interests at stake is helpful in an analysis of the
Bosch rule. The federal interest here is in protecting the federal fisc from inac-
curate state court determinations resulting in the loss of federal tax revenues.
The antipodal interest is the state interest in giving some credence to state
court determinations rather than having them completely disregarded in federal
courts. There are several reasons behind this interest of the state courts. One
is the policy of discouraging federal interference with the administration of
state law whenever possible. Another is that state courts have an expertise rela-
tive to their state law that federal courts should acknowledge and make use of
to as great an extent as possible. Also, since we live under a dual system of
government, uniformity and consistency between state and federal law is an
important goal.
The Bosch approach more than adequately protects the federal interest,
but does not seem to consider sufficiently the interest of the state courts. A
slight limitation of the Bosch rule, in order to more adequately protect state
court interests, would seem to be desirable.
A presumption in favor of the accuracy of state court determinations would
appear to give these decisions more viability, and would decrease the chances
that they will be later disregarded in the federal courts. Under such a presump-
tion, the Commissioner would have the burden of proving that the state
court determination was inaccurate relative to state law and, therefore, not
worthy of being followed by the federal court. The standard to be used to
determine whether the Commissioner has met this burden is, of course, a prob-
lem. A standard requiring too much of the Commissioner would not adequately
protect the federal tax revenue from losses due to inaccurate state court deter-
minations, and therefore would be inconsistent with the spirit of Bosch. On the
other hand, a standard requiring too little of the Commissioner would not suffi-
ciently consider the interest of giving state court decrees some credence in
federal courts. The "persuasive data" standard used by federal courts in decid-
ing whether to disregard a state intermediate appellate court decision is cited
approvingly in Bosch58 and may be of use in the development of a standard for
handling state trial court determinations. It may be argued that the Court's
use of the phrase "proper regard to relevant rulings of other courts of the state"50
justifies a presumption favoring the accuracy of state court determinations.
However, this phrase may also have been intended to illustrate that the federal
court sits as a state court in that it considers state law and relevant rulings of
58. The Court stated, "An intermediate appellate state court . . . is a datum for
ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced
by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Id., at
464, quoting from West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
59. The Court stated, "If there be no decision by that court [state's highest court]
then federal authority must apply what it finds to be the state law after giving 'proper
regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State." Id. at 465.
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other courts of the state. Presumably a standard by which the court may
determine if the Commissioner had adequately shown a state decision to be
inaccurate, thus requiring the federal court to determine state law itself, will
have to be developed through case law. Abstract, theoretical characterizations of
a standard such as this are of little value without concrete examples of its appli-
cation to facts from which guidelines may be drawn by the courts.
Ideally, this "presumption" favoring a state court determination would
protect and consider both interests involved here. Inaccurate state court deter-
minations would not be followed by the federal court, but the advantages of
using the state court decision would not be ignored without good reason. The
expertise of the state court vis-a-vis state law would be utilized, there would
be as little federal interference with the administration of state law as possible,
and the uniformity between federal and state law would increase. In addition,
knowledge that an inaccurate state court determination can be ignored would
have a two-fold effect on persons contemplating an action in a state court:
first, it would discourage actions brought solely to avoid taxes which have no
rational basis in state law, and second, it would encourage those with sound
cases, since the federal court would not ignore the state decision unless it was
shown to be clearly inaccurate under relevant state law.
Thus, it would seem that a presumption favoring the accuracy of state court
determinations would, by slightly limiting the Bosch rule, result in an approach
that better protects all the interests involved.
MICHAEL R. MCGEE
LABOR LAW-NLRB's LACK OF REMEDIAL POWER IN A RUNAWAY
PLANT SITUATION
Finding adequate remedies to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act1 is one of the major problems facing the National Labor Relations
Board. A recent case, Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.)2'
focuses sharply on one aspect of this problem. The employer, Garwin Corpora-
tion, was found by the Board to have moved its operations from New York to
Florida to avoid dealing with the union representing its employees in New
York. The Board ordered the employer to offer the New York employees, either
reinstatement with back pay and moving expenses (if the employer remained
at the Florida location), or reimbursement of income lost from the date of dis-
charge until similar employment was found. The employer was also required
to bargain with the union irrespective of the location chosen and the union's
1. National Labor Relations Act, § 10c, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964) empowers the Board "to take such affirmative action . . 'as will effectuate the
policies of the act."
2. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).'
